Introduction
More than Images

> The dichotomy between witnessing these scenes and fulfilling the role of the reporter is evident in the account of Roman Karmen, who recalls himself and his colleagues overcoming their emotions as they recorded images of civilians killed by the Nazis near Moscow in 1941 and 1942 but weeping as they saw the rushes. Similarly, the American photographer Margaret Bourke-White, on an assignment for *Life* magazine, recalls truly registering the sights for the first time only on seeing the eventual prints, when "the protective veil" had been lifted.
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> —Jeremy Hicks, *First Films of the Holocaust: Soviet Cinema and the Genocide of the Jews, 1938–1946*

Atrocities and the Suffering of Others

In *American Pastoral* (1997), the first novel of Philip Roth's American trilogy, an aging narrator acts as chronicler for the generation that lived the glory and suffered the disappointments of World War II. In one passage in particular, the narrator discovers with horror the misfortune that befell his childhood classmate who embodied the most promising of his generation and seemed destined for social success: Seymour Levov, although his classmates had given him the nickname the Swede. As the narration reveals through indirect methods, we learn that the Swede spends the final years of his existence delving into the reasons why his promising future had plummeted to such depths: the course of his life irremissibly went astray the day his beloved and only daughter, Merry, a fragile stuttering young woman, committed a senseless attack on the local post office, taking a man's life. From that moment, Seymour, ever the idealist, ceaselessly and torturously racks his brain as to what could have caused his daughter's monstruous metamorphosis and about the shadow of his own responsibility in this change. In one of the compulsive returns to the past, he believes

to have found the spark that ignited the fire: a scene that took place when Merry was barely ten years old. The setting was the homely living room; the year, 1962 or 1963, about the time—the Swede remembers—President John Kennedy was assassinated. Suddenly, before the astonished eyes of her parents, the girl's body remained petrified upon seeing the flashes emitted by the television screen: on a central street in the remote city of Saigon, an elderly Buddhist monk was on fire. Doused with gasoline by fellow monks, the man had set himself on fire as a protest against the measures of Ngo Dinh Diem's government. Emaciated, with a shaven head, upright back, legs crossed as if meditating, donning a saffron colored tunic that bestowed him a superhuman dignity, the old man's body remained imperturbable to the flames consuming him. Around him, passersby witnessed the event "as though to observe a religious ritual" (Roth 1997: 153). The images emitted by the television could not transmit the monk's pain, if he did in fact feel any; nor did it transmit the surprise, stupor, fascination, or indignation of those surrounding him. And, nevertheless, thousands of kilometers away and in grainy black and white, something pierced the young girl's spirit, something that impeded her from taking her eyes off of the scene. Once the image had faded, Merry's sobs continued for weeks, as if the vision had embedded itself inside her. And when the child seemed to have recovered from the shock, the atrocious event happened again: another Vietnamese monk set himself aflame before a crowd and in the presence of news cameras; and then came another and another. There was no turning back from Merry's affliction: its anchors had been cast in the world. Her father would torture himself trying to unravel the meaning of that involuntary rite of passage that had shattered Merry's compassion. What had happened to her resistance? What had the child seen through those incomprehensible scenes?: "Was she imagining herself as one of those monks? Was she watching because she was still appalled or was she watching now because she was excited? What was starting to unsettle him, to frighten him, was the idea that Merry was less horrified now than curious" (Roth 1998: 155).

No one would be able to assure that this brutal exposure to horror, both raw and mediatized, could be found in the origin of a suffering that, along with the change in conscience that the year 1968 entailed for the United States, would be galvanized by hate. From feelings of susceptibility to collapsing defenses, and from there to resentment, which Merry's own identity could be rebuilt with, climbing to the last rung, and the next step toward the criminal act: in all of this there could have been an inexorable link. But this, all in all, was nothing

more than a presumption, a causal hypothesis; in no case a certainty. The impenetrable mystery as to the origin and nature of this interior spring, so fatally disactivated, would endure.

The episode narrated by Roth is telling of a chasm between the viewing of atrocities and the psychic encounter—the recognition, perhaps—with the suffering of the other; a divorce where content refers less to the capacity to understand than to the quasi-traumatic impact of the scene. Only many years later would the Swede finally begin to house the suspicion that it was in this fleeting episode that the metamorphosis that dehumanized his daughter operated. Perhaps she, disarmed by the pathetic intensity her senses were submitted to, cleared her feeling in order to cease to be conscience-stricken and careened (it was not a conscious decision in any case) toward the self-dehumanization that always precedes the dehumanization of the other. It was perhaps this desensitization to the pain of others, which proved unbearable in its utter excess, that led her to cross the Rubicon and destroy others' lives.[1]

The irruption of these images of atrocity into the gentle home Roth submerges us in, an American home that thought itself safe from any outside threat, is reminiscent of the twenty collages Martha Rosler composed between 1967 and 1972, where the Vietnam War imagery shook American life on a daily basis. *House Beautiful: Bringing the War Home* (MoMA) offered the image of the jungle and the massacres with the rough and dirty textures of photographic and television press formats, thus detonating the unblemished domestic designs associated with well-being that American advertising exhibited with pride. In these collages, upon pulling back the limpid curtain, approaching the glass picture window, when fixing one's eyes on the living room painting, the domestic scene fell apart and the eye was assaulted by the horror of a foul and absurd war: women and children murdered in the village of My Lai, explosions that ripped bodies apart, corpses in the sun and humidity, and the unrecognizable battlefield of an irregular war in the Asian jungle. Just like the fragile girl in the novel *American Pastoral*, whoever came across Rosler's images could not help but feel the family sanctum sanctorum was being invaded by images that tore apart the veil of comfort and inner peace.

Shock, Pathos, and Action

The panorama presented by scenes of atrocities that smack the naked, unprepared eye lay bare a type of image bestowed with an explosive

power that overflows the safe terrain we call representation. Indeed—and the example of *American Pastoral* expresses it admirably—images of atrocities place in check the very concept of the image (photomechanical or digital) as a verisimilar expression of objective reality. Clearly, it is not a matter of representation being absent in them but rather that the notion itself proves insufficient to apprehend genuineness in this visual genre, at least on three levels: first, the shock produced by an impact that seeks to destabilize the image's narrative condition; second, the pathos that seeks to assimilate itself into trauma's structure of compulsive repetition; and, third, the incitement to provoke in the receiver a desire to act on the real world with the aim of changing it. On these three levels, our visual objects behave like untamed, aggressive images because of their content and form, against the spectator's perceptive and emotional system.[2]

The first of these questions demands that images of atrocity, because of their instantaneous and sharp nature (their arrow-like structure, we may say), short-circuit the construction of a lineal narrative where causes and effects, arguments, and conclusions unfold. These images impose, in contrast, a jolt or, to use a term popular during the avant-garde era, an attraction; that is, the intense moment in which a spectacle is produced that "brings to light in the spectator those senses or that psychology . . . mathematically calculated to produce certain emotional shocks" (Eisenstein 1957: 230–31). The second question, when invoking atrocious events whose object is one human's suffering observed by another, stimulates an overflowing pathos that, in turn, afflicts the spectator instead of settling to awaken feelings of empathy. The third question is that its ideal objective consists in promoting an acting-out in the recipient, an act destined to transform the state of things presented by the image. This action, born of indignation or awe, may oscillate between humanitarian commitment aimed at repairing suffering and a justice-seeking militancy in search of revenge. Nothing carried this logic further than the videos produced by Daesh-ISIS aimed at the paradoxical mission of sowing panic in the West and, at the same time, recruiting followers for jihad.

These three aspects involve very complex dialectical tensions, but if they have something in common it is their authors' longing (inherited by their spectators) to transcend the images' condition as visual representation and to be prolonged through action. In short, images of atrocities shake us with virulence, seek to traumatize us through exhibitions of horror, and demand from us an active position in accordance with their violence: in short, they aspire to be more than images (Boltanski 2004).[3]

The Question of Narrative: Atrocity as Attraction

From her first book dedicated to photography published in 1973 to the later *Regarding the Pain of Others* published shortly before her death (2003), Susan Sontag ceaselessly delved into the aggressive potential possessed by photographs of atrocities and the harm, in contrast, they entail for human understanding. She described it precociously, going back to her own experience as a young girl, when she lacked tools for unraveling their meaning:

> One's first encounter with the photographic inventory of ultimate horror is a kind of revelation, the prototypically modern revelation: a negative epiphany. For me, it was photographs of Bergen-Belsen and Dachau which I came across by chance in a bookstore in Santa Monica in July 1945. Nothing I have seen—in photographs or in real life—ever cut me as sharply, deeply, instantaneously. Indeed, it seems plausible to me to divide my life into two parts, before I saw those photographs (I was twelve) and after, though it was several years before I understood fully what they were about. What good was served by seeing them? They were only photographs—of an event I had scarcely heard of and could do nothing to affect, of suffering I could hardly imagine and could do nothing to relieve. When I looked at those photographs, something broke. Some limit had been reached, and not only that of horror; I felt irrevocably grieved, wounded, but a part of my feeling started to tighten; something went dead; something is still crying. (Sontag 2005: 14–15)

The author's laying bare of her own recollection is, in turn, a verdict on this type of image's destabilizing power on the psyche. The shock, as conceived here, immobilizes, weakens the senses, suspends reason. And the author insists on opposing a narrative form of comprehension (which she associates with the functioning of reason) with the consumption of images of atrocity (which collapses understanding). However, Sontag seems to have attenuated her radicalness in the opposition. Whether consuming such images accustoms (and, therefore, anesthetizes) one to them or not is a matter of debate, but the opposition between a logic aimed at the eye and another at narrative is undeniable to her; and this is in (moral) benefit to the latter: "only that which narrates can make us understand" (Sontag 2005: 18). On the other hand, she associates photography with a successive timeline of events, which she relates with the functioning of memory. There is something of lamentation in these words: "The problem," she writes, "is not that people remember through photographs, but that they remember only the photographs. This remembering through photo-

graphs eclipses other forms of understanding, and remembering. . . . To remember is, more and more, not to recall a story but to be able to call up a picture" (Sontag 2003: 89).[4]

This conceptualization of images of atrocities as jolts is not new. It has a long history, one whose pivotal moment is the avant-garde poetics that sought to place the spectator as receptacle of violence, whether by way of surprise or by aggression. Dadaist theories of chance postulated it so; surrealists with their concepts of the oneiric and of the objet trouvé or Bertolt Brecht with his distancing effect (the famous *V-Effekt* or *Verfremdung*). But if there was an area in which chance became calculated aggression, it was when Sergei M. Eisenstein formulated it in terms mentioned above. The author aspired to lead the spectator by force of calculated shocks (attractions) that would work on their conscience. The way the jolts would be combined was never resolved by the author, as it expresses the contradiction between avant-garde eccentrism and Marxist efficiency leading to an ideological position taking. But this does not diminish its worth in the slightest.

Be that as it may, the opposition between images of atrocity and narrative proves problematic, as perhaps the greatest aspiration of the photograph consists in offering a synthetic narration through a visual crystallization. Do we not read images of violence attending to questions such as who are the active and passive subjects therein, what happened before, and what will the outcome be when all is shown?

Emotion and Performativity

Sontag's quote not only alludes to perceptive shock, but also to the emotional impact received by a young girl, innocent of all horrifying experience, who, like Merry, remained irremissibly afflicted. In this case, the pathos is no longer an act of empathy translated to identification with a person; it is converted into an experience so intense that it threatens to destabilize the spectator's spirit. Both the spectacle logic of war journalism and technical advances in postproduction intensify this trend.

Nevertheless, what is truly significant about visual atrocities is that the pathos appears to be associated with the logics of trauma in a period dominated by the medico-social expansion of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD): it is as if the viewing of the act entailed vicarious trauma. What is sought out is to lead the spectator to a compulsive return to the image and no image does so more than the image of a human being's pain caused by another human being:[5] the child Aylan's small, drowned body washed up on the shore of a beach where he was

meant to land; a group of Jewish women in undergarments on a beach in Skede about to be executed, with the Baltic Sea on one side and the gigantic jaws of the mass grave behind them; a naked Iraqi prisoner dragged like a dog by the US solider Lynndie England, and other examples. All of these figures of affliction incarnate a vulnerable and defenseless victim in a time—that is, our present time—where individuals aspire to the status of victim and its inevitable correlative reign: the empire of trauma (Fassin and Rechtman 2009).

That said, images of atrocity were born with the intention of transforming reality or changing subjects that live therein. They provoke indignation—this would be its lesser profile—or they incite active combat. This was that classical function of propaganda, both for Joseph Goebbels and for Willi Münzenberg, who both left nothing to chance. But upon a closer look at this performative force (an utterance that is transformed into action, like in the classic example: "This court finds you guilty of murder and sentences you to death"), it has two faces: one is the action that it provokes in the spectator; the other, the one that consummates the image itself in the moment it is produced. It is well known that images of violence exercised by the enemy are decisive in creating a community of hate, a bond of vengeance, and dehumanization of said enemy. The other question—the violence that produces the image itself—is the true object of this book.

Perpetrator Images

In regards to the representation of human suffering, the functioning of images of atrocity offers us a cognitive framework for our study, but it does not constitute clearly the central topic of our research. The work in question delves particularly into the singular and enigmatic form that some of these images adopt: those we have called perpetrator images. In these images, the aforementioned characteristics are carried to the extreme. It was Marianne Hirsch (2001) who coined them as such in a text that has hitherto had little continuity. In the term *perpetrator images*, we are not referring to the representation's theme or motif; that is, they are not images that represent perpetrators. *Perpetrator* defines the phrase itself: namely images taken by perpetrators of mass crimes, torture, or genocide as part of the criminal act. To take a photograph, film a torture session, or record an execution with a mobile phone are not banal acts; they constitute something primordial in order to understand the nature of criminal acts and offer keys that cannot be obtained through any other source.

The first questions addressed in this study refer to the identity and relation between authors of images and the authors of the crimes, and to the degree of symbiosis—rapport or autonomy—between them. In order to elucidate this question, it is necessary to determine the authors' belonging to any military or paramilitary, political, religious, or criminal organization, as well as answering some questions: Do the criminals themselves film, perhaps handing off the camera(s) in middle of the massacre? Or, on the contrary, are the murderers' accomplices the ones who photograph and film the scene? Are they subordinates in the hierarchical order of the criminal project? What degree of freedom do the authors of the visual work have when capturing their images?

A second series of questions refers to the intentions motivating the visual record. Is it a matter of documenting the crime for the authorities who ordered it or of conserving it as an internal record? Or is it perhaps a product of some of the group members' own sadism? In this sense, it would be necessary to conceive of different intermediate degrees between meticulous planning and complete spontaneity. A third series of questions refers to the interaction among subjects implicated in the action. In what way does the filming or the taking of pictures interfere with the course of events, in particular, with the executioners' behavior and with the victim's suffering? The possibilities range from the victim's total lack of awareness of being filmed or photographed to the pain originating from the sinister dramatics in preparation for the fatal moment.

The fourth series of questions arises from a rather sinister observation: the recording of a violent act against a victim turns representation into an object susceptible to arousing emotion that, additionally, strengthens group ties. Participating in the iniquitous act (whose authors do not consider it as such) takes on the shape of a secret for novice participants. Because of this, maintaining its condition as a sort of spell is just as transcendental as withholding it from circulation among subjects from outside the inner circle. In any case, the degrees of closeness are utterly ambiguous. A fifth set of questions stems from the previous one: if this material was conceived to be a talisman, what had to occur for the protective seal to be violated, causing the material to emerge, falling into enemy hands or those of unwanted observers? Was it by chance, or because of carelessness, or due to hubris on behalf of a member of the group that led to unchosen individuals gaining access to it?

Lastly, these images, by virtue of their obscene enunciation and stripped of minimal dissimulation, are a finding of the utmost value for the adversary, who will no doubt celebrate having discovered them

with both enthusiasm and horror. After being found, the material would be interpreted as an involuntary self-accusation, a signed statement of maliciousness, which would allow for its unbarred distribution among the public. The way the fragment is presented from this moment on would depend on moral, political, and testimonial standards of each time period, as well as on geographic context and on its outlook. As a consequence, a series of changes could be made: the incorporation of an explanatory voice-over; a deconstructing device through editing or a subtle presentation of the raw fragment, perhaps dressed with slight cuts, without discarding the possibility of its parasitic use, as if it were a drawing. Nor can we ignore the fact that the fascination this type of images provokes may be due to an unsettling voyeuristic effect.

What is beyond a doubt is that perpetrator images unsettle, move, and, at the same time, give the impression of never aging. They preserve, regardless of their technological primitivity or their poor construction, a disturbing potential, as if each time they are viewed they revived the violence that begot them and contaminated them forever. This is precisely the reason why in these pages we consider perpetrator images to be the most inextricable nexus of images of atrocity.

Limits and Precautions: This Side of Mass Crimes

A misunderstanding must be clarified. Perpetrator images are not limited to representations of mass violence. This modality also includes other areas within the realm of crime and does so with a growing presence in mass media. One only need recall videos of vandalism, street fights, or gang rapes recorded by its offenders to recognize a disturbing phenomenon, which is a corollary to the availability of recording devices today within reach of any member of the public. One of the most infamous cases in recent years occurred in Spain, which also caused the most ink to be spilled, confirms it: the case known as *"la manada* case." During the Sanfermines festival in Pamplona in July 2016, a group of five young men from Seville, who called themselves *la manada* (the pack), gang-raped a young woman while other members of the group recorded the attack on a mobile telephone and, almost instantaneously, sent the video to acquaintances, all while making jocular comments encouraging the other members to participate in the tragic act. The video was analyzed by judges, one of whom issued a dissenting opinion that provoked indignation in many sectors of society, as he wrote that he had only seen in the recording "uninhibitedness and sexually explicit acts in an atmosphere of partying and delight."[6]

The fragments in question were barely 59 and 39 seconds. This visual material and the context of social and media mobilization led to other videos of the accused being considered perpetrator images, although they showed nothing more than banal sequences of partying, consuming alcohol, and dancing. As we said, the event moved and mobilized public opinion and the sentence's ambiguity was the spark that led, at the height of the #MeToo movement, to questioning certain judges' supposed prejudices, demanding a change in legislation and giving way to slogans that have persisted well beyond this case in particular. Undoubtedly, the images in question are perpetrator images, but this form—whose study and circulation, uses and abuses possess great forensic relevance—lies beyond the scope of our book; all of this, however, does not impede our study from hoping to illuminate its fine-tuned research from a methodological perspective.

This may seem to suggest that perpetrator images condense iniquity in its pure state and require little attention other than recommending they be left hidden or censored. Nevertheless, when they are examined closely, they prove to be documents of the utmost complexity, precisely by virtue of their fragmentation, the mystery surrounding their origin and motivations, their circulation, and often the impossibility of arriving at their original form. And they are no less so due to the general amateur character of their formats, the varying skill of the takes, and the scarce concern for preserving the material beyond a small, elite group. The results generated by such an object of study could not be more insufficient: horrible copies, misplaced negatives, multiplicity of difficult, if not impossible, pieces to assemble, scarcity of information about the authors, utter silence in regards to the intentions or outright denial, among others. Even in the case that such images have been projected before courts, restored and archived in memorial museums or research centers, even if they have been scrutinized by specialists to the point of leaving no corner unobserved, they invariably preserve something about the mystery that surrounded their origin and that stigmatized them from the moment of their rediscovery.

All of this contributes to making visual perpetrator documents disturbing and enigmatic. But therein lies precisely their enormous potential as historical documents: not only do they reveal (albeit sometimes obliquely) criminal acts, but they also lay bare (and, thus, contribute to understanding) how the criminals who executed them conceived them and, to the extent that the physical gaze is linked to a way of seeing (what Marianne Hirsch called "gaze" as opposed to "look" [2001]),[7] they allow us to approach the agents of crime's psychology as perhaps no other document would. Ambiguous in so many ways, these texts

are only eloquent when questioned in light of others they enter into dialogue with. They are a useful filter to penetrate an ideology that has turned into an act, a conception of the crime against the enemy as something legitimate and shared. At the end of our path, something of the unfathomable abyss will persist.

From the Abjection in Images

The nature of perpetrator images allows us to define their guidelines, the questions they respond to, the pertinence with which we examine them, and the documents likely to fill in gaps of knowledge or confirm their content. Nonetheless, each perpetrator image is unique and irreducible because it is measured, formally and morally, in relation to the situation that has made it possible for agents and patients to coexist with traumatic spaces and overloaded moments. Let us explain ourselves. If the ideal—allow us to formulate this apparent moral abomination—of a perpetrator image consists in the identity of the agent of the crime and of whoever took the image, simultaneously and in the same place, experience shows us that unknowns abound. For example, in a country where judicial courts have been wiped out or ignored, would not images captured by a photographer in a torture and extermination center before subjecting an individual to violent interrogation be considered perpetrator images? This simple case highlights the need for detailed, almost detective-like analysis.

Perpetrator images burn: they did so in the past to those who had the misfortune of suffering them, perhaps also those who were fascinated by them when committing the act; so, too, do images burn later for those who view them. We are not always prepared to analyze their fire. To do so we need observation that would reestablish connections with other materials, in addition to not allowing ourselves to be defeated by their elusive character. As indispensable as they are for the historian, they demand the historian's sharpest skills, maximum determination, as the images will never contribute everything we may expect and need of them. At the antipodes of transparency, they are images saturated with emotion and pain and often provoke repulsion. Yet they are nevertheless indispensable. Marie-José Mondzain (2002) posed the question whether these images could kill. It would be frivolous to respond affirmatively, but if some of their modalities graze this deadly, ignoble, and, at the same time, electrifying vocation *malgré nous*, this is what perpetrator images draw, on a surreal background, in life, mind, or both together, confused as one. In this book, we will

follow the wake of their infamous star. It will be a way of penetrating the darkest recesses of the human being, wherever the mirror that the images are confirms for us where radical evil resides.

Organization of the Book

The present book has been conceived of in two parts, coherent with the idea that perpetrator images are in need of conceptualization, but also of a meticulous study of the inalienable and unrepeatable conditions they are produced in. In accordance with this, the first part consists of two chapters that frame their place within images of atrocity (chapter 1) and propose a methodology for their study (chapter 2). In both, the theoretical reflections are punctuated by illustrative analyses of singular cases that not only contribute to making their reading more intelligible, but also delve into their details.

The second part of the volume is comprised of three monographic chapters that address three perpetrator image series without avoiding their shadowy areas and that question their conflictive status. The first (chapter 3) centers on two icon images of religious profanation in Spain during the days after the rising that led to the Spanish Civil War, that is, when the war was not yet a war; the subsequent chapter (chapter 4) studies a film commissioned by the propaganda minister of the Third Reich, Joseph Goebbels, in the Warsaw Ghetto in the spring of 1942, when the facilities of the Treblinka extermination camp where those Jews were to be liquidated were being finished; the final chapter (chapter 5) focuses on two of the more than five thousand photographs preserved from those taken by the documentation services of the Khmer Rouge (Cambodia, 1975–1978) in the prison S-21, which identified two women who would be tortured and executed.

In this second part, we confirm the hypothesis that each case constitutes a microcosm in which image and criminal action are interwoven in a singular way and, as a consequence, whose analysis requires a double skill: that of the general historian and that of the historian of images. The fact that the historicity of a photograph, a film fragment, or a video is not something external to the image but rather inscribed in its material and language in technical and semiotic forms entails recognizing that these marks and traces of historicity refer back to a pragmatic situation.

By virtue of this, the three cases we deal with, all of them impure, will be examined, first in their production and function, in their migration and through their appropriation by other discourses. This double

life of perpetrator images refers to two instances: when they were in the hands of their authors and the later moment in which they passed to enemy hands. This existence can be so vast that it extends from counterpropaganda to articles of historical or social heritage deposited and exhibited in museums.

We have sought to give this research a comprehensible tone for the cultured reader interested in history and issues related to human rights, genocide, mass violence, but also for those who, from the fields of image, communication, and journalism studies, deal with the production and circulation of images of atrocity.

Notes

Epigraph: Hicks (2012: 9).

1. Merry would go on to live a life enveloped in an act of unconscious contrition: a convert to Jainism who dares not even to wash herself in order to preserve all life, including that of the parasites who feed off of her.
2. Lilie Chouliaraki (2006) speaks of a type of news that she calls "ecstatic," wherein the use of live footage provokes a paralyzing shock that induces action. The paradigmatic example is given in her opinion of the 11 September 2001 attack in southern Manhattan.
3. *Distant Suffering*, as formulated by Luc Boltanski (2004), addresses the problem of authenticity in the world of spectacle and, therefore, its form of expression plays a central role in the social and political connection.
4. In this book the author is less blunt when asserting that "a narrative seems likely to be more effective than an image" (Sontag 2003: 122).
5. Even when the aggressor is not visible, their presence may be implied.
6. Although the trial continued, the sentence may be consulted: See Sección Segunda de la Audiencia Provincial de Navarra. 2018. "Sentence number 000038/2018." *Sección Segunda de la Audiencia Provincial de Navarra*, 26 April, 244. Retrieved 20 February 2024 from https://e00-elmundo.uecdn.es/documentos/2018/04/26/sentencia_juicio_la_manada.pdf.
7. Marianne Hirsch develops this distinction in relation with the *familial gaze* in her book *Family Frames* (Hirsch, 1997). In a later publication (Hirsch 2001: 23), she applies this concept to the perpetrators' case.